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 “This point of view is that of vital normativity. Even for an amoeba, living means preference and 
exclusion”, (George Canguilhem: The Normal and the Patological) 
“The basic character of phenomenology is that it is a scientific philosophy of life”, (Edmund Husserl, 
Husserliana, Volume 32, p. 241). 
 
Introduction 
An essential characteristic of life as such is to create norms. To live means for the living being 
to normalize its relationship towards environment and itself. In the core of our presentation is 
the thesis that consciousness has fundamentally different levels, and each level has a peculiarly 
normative character. In this presentation I will offer a comparative analysis of different levels 
of life, which we interpret as an essentially norm-generating process or activity. We use this 
analysis to understand the origins of conscious experience, as a higher form of life. The notion 
of consciousness, which we keep in mind, is embodied mind and experience – such a 
conception, which we could find already in Husserl, and which was the basic point of 
orientation for Merleau-Ponty. The consciousness-object correlation, which was the primary 
form of intentionality in Husserl, in its more concrete form was the correlation of lived body 
(Leib) and its environment (Umwelt). In this context normativity, as the essence of life, appears 
as the lived body’s active and dynamic relationship to its environment, in order to achieve the 
optimal circumstances of sustaining its life-functions. This question belongs essentially to a 
field what we could call – following Husserl – “phenomenological somatology”, (in Husserl 
see e.g.: Hua [= Husserliana] 5: §§2-3). What is especially interesting from our actual point of 
view, is that there is a significant difference between organic bodies with a consciousness on 
the one hand, and organic bodies without consciousness on the other. The final goal of my 
project is to make possible a coherent phenomenological explanation of the genesis of 
conscious experience. In this approach the problem of behaviour has a central importance. 
Behaviour, strictly regarded, proves to be the expression, the visual manifestation of the internal 
psychic life of a subject. It unifies the internal and external moments of an embodied subject in 
a coherent structure – as Merleau-Ponty emphasized that, but it is a thought that we could find 
in a well-articulated way in Husserl also. With regard to the problem of normativity and 
normalization: we should speak of conscious and non-conscious forms of normativity in life. 
Behaviour, in this problem-field, is a conscious or semi-conscious activity of a subject. 
Regarding these definitions, we should raise the questions: which beings have a consciousness 
and which don’t? How can we prove it in a phenomenologically way? 
In this presentation I would like to offer some initial remarks, to contribute to a systematic 
phenomenological theory concerning the genesis of conscious experience in the natural world; 
with a special regard to the normative character of experience, on the basis of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty. In my opinion, their considerations on the topic could be connected in a fruitful 
way to the actual scientific researches concerning the origins of consciousness in nature. 
Following the views of authors like Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, I also think that 
phenomenological analyses could serve as a point of orientation, as a leading clue to natural 
scientific investigations about the main structures of consciousness. In this presentation I also 
would like to contribute to the phenomenological grounding of such scientific tasks and 
endeavours.  
 
I. Husserl on the levels consciousness in the animal world 
In the first part of our presentation, which focuses on Husserl’s thoughts concerning the 
emergence of conscious experience in nature, first of all we will have a closer look on lower 
levels of animality (and to the normativity which is inherent to it); especially for the reason, 
that we would like to shed light on the genesis of conscious experience in general. So, in this 
presentation we cannot treat in details the problem of human consciousness, which is also of 
fundamental importance in the overall context of this problem-field, but its preconditions in the 
nature, and its earlier (or possibly earliest) pre-forms (precursory or preliminary forms). Husserl 
constructed and tried out many ways to make animal consciousness available for a first person 
perspective account (so: for phenomenological description). Here we cannot treat all of them 
(or even most of them); that would lead us very far; only some of them, which we consider to 
be the most relevant from our present point of view. What is first and foremost important for 
us here, is the constitution of animal – and even lower level natural – bodies. 
A decisive question for our present topic, is the connection between immanence and 
transcendence. Husserl elaborated a very peculiar form of monism, which means the monism 
of phenomena: there are only phenomena with an immanent and a transcendent aspect.1  First 
of all we have to understand the link of immanence and transcendence in his notion of noema. 
Then we could proceed to the problem of constitution of body; and especially to the constitution 
                                                          
1 Cf. Shigeru Taguchi: Das Problem des, Ur-Ich bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen, 
Nähe’ des Selbst. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006: 7. 
of connection between the internal and external aspect of the body; the constitution of 
phenomenological unity of subjective and objective body, of Leib and Körper. After this we 
could make an attempt to unfold the phenomenological meaning of the functionality of body 
parts, of organs; and particularly of those which are – in a certain way – causally responsible 
for the emergence and functioning of consciousness (such as the nervous system and the 
especially the brain). Finally, we can say some words about the different levels consciously 
functioning bodies in nature, and about the normativity which is peculiar to those levels. 
 
1.1. The “determinable X” as the link between immanence and transcendence 
In Husserl’s Ideas (1912) the relationship between consciousness and its object has a threefold 
structure: noesis (conscious act), noema (objective sense or meaning) and the object simpliciter 
(der Gegenstand schlechthin). In the phenomenological reduction the object appears as an 
objective sense, a unity of sense. However, as Husserl emphasizes it, there is a fundamental 
difference between the noema and the object simpliciter, (Hua 3/1: §89). The noema of a tree 
is the objective sense; it cannot be burnt, it cannot be dissolved into its chemical elements. The 
tree simpliciter, the transcendent tree, on the other hand, could be burnt and dissolved into its 
chemical parts. The noema, the objective sense is immanent, the object itself is transcendent. 
But, furthermore, the noema also has several layers and components. It has marginal and more 
important moments. The fundamental parts of a noema are called “noematic cores” (there could 
be many of them). They make up the essential, central layer of the noema. But there is 
something even more essential and central: what Husserl calls as “determinable X”; a central 
moment which organizes around itself all other noematic moments. That is the bridge between 
immanence and transcendence. To avoid misunderstandings: the theory of the “determinable 
X” is not a “proof of the existence of external reality”. It is a theory of the genesis of the sense 
of objective reality. From our present point of view this theory is important for the reason, that 
the relationship of subjective and objective aspect of the body, and thus the connection of 
embodied mind and its environment, is similar to the relationship of immanent and transcendent 
aspect of object, through the “determinable X”. 
 
1.2. Connection of subjective and objective body. Constitution of functional bodily 
organs 
Husserl offers us a detailed account of the phenomenology of the body – amongst other works 
– in his 1907 lecture Thing and Space (Hua 16), in the second book of Ideas (Hua 4) and the 
Cartesian Meditations (Hua 1). According to these descriptions, my body is an essentially 
incompletely constituted object. The other people around me can constitute my body always in 
a more complete way, than I can. They can see my back. Without a mirror I cannot. In the 
constitution of space my body is the absolute zero-point. On the other hand, I have a first person 
access to my own body. From this point of view my body appears as a coherent system of bodily 
feelings and sensations, and of capacity of free movement, a system of possible bodily actions, 
(“I can”-s). These latter make up the subjective aspect of my body. The perpetual functioning 
of my body makes me able to coordinate its subjective and objective aspect. In the end my body 
is constituted as the fundamental mode in which I can get in touch with objective reality. 
Through my permanent intercourse with the world, during the constitution of my body, the 
subjective and objective moments are intimately and inseparably interwoven. One aspect cannot 
be constituted without the other. 
In the constitution of bodily existence, the constitution of nervous system, and especially 
the brain, has a peculiar role and importance. If there is a damage in them, the ways in which I 
can constitute myself and the world, are also damaged. The system of “I can” is injured. The 
nervous system, the brain, aren’t constituted with the same sense and meaning as other objects 
in the world, external to my body and independent from it. They have the meaning of integrating 
the consciousness into the causal order of the natural world. The nervous system and the brain 
are constituted with the meaning, that they form a functional bridge between the world of 
spiritual motivations and that of natural causal relations. 
According to Husserl, I can constitute non-human animal beings as conscious, as far as 
they are similar enough to my functional and bodily structures. Of course, it is not an exact 
criterion: but it could be made so, through a phenomenological, constitutional analysis of the 
bodily organs and functional system, which is attentive and detailed enough. In Husserl’s 
opinion, we could attribute consciousness with a well-founded reason at least to living beings 
with a nervous system. So, he speaks about the phenomenology of jellyfishes (Qualle) for time 
to time, (e.g. Hua 14: 112-119, Hua 36: 163). In his reconstructions the experience of a jellyfish 
appears as a very rudimentary flow of primitive hyletic data.  
 
1.3. Levels of conscious experience and normativity  
In Husserl’s opinion their historical—cultural embedment and highly developed self-
consciousness make human beings able to evolve a very rich and sophisticated cultural and 
spiritual world. Animals do not have a cultural generativity, like human communities.2 Animal 
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Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_culture 
constitution of the world, to use the expression of Heidegger, is “poor in world” (“Weltarm”).3  
Animals do have a general curiosity of their own – but in a very poor, rudimentary form. Their 
main interests are determined by factors of survival, by issues of self-sustainment. They seek 
food in the world, water, potential sexual partner; they are up to identify potential dangers and 
threat. The animal discloses a world, in which he or she must find food, drink, partner; and in 
which he or she is a potential prey for predators. The animal being-in-the-world is related to a 
world of survival. Their organs are adapted to such a scarce, dangerous and threatening world; 
a world, full of enjoyment, pain and stress.  
The bodily organs of animals grant an access to such a scarce and dangerous (and, in a 
limited sense, also interesting) world. Animal organs are constituted to constitute such a world, 
(or, more precisely, such an environment). The more complex the animal organs and especially 
the sensorimotor apparatus are, the richer and more detailed the environment is, which is 
unfolded through them. The way in which experience – even within the sphere of animality – 
is functioning is essentially normative, norm-giving. According to Husserl, there are four 
fundamental levels of normativity (or normality, which – in this particular context – is the same) 
in experience (expressed in juxtapositions): concordance—discordance, optimal—non optimal, 
typical—atypical and familiar—alien.4 These levels of normativity could be found already in 
animal experience. Animals constitute their environing world according to these levels of 
normativity; the more complex their psychophysical body is, the more sophisticated is the mode 
of constitution of this environment, and the concrete forms and modes of normativity, which is 
inherent to the correlation of lived body and its environment.  
An important question that are there living beings under the level of animals conscious? 
Husserl in some manuscripts tends to adopt the opinion that every living organism has a 
consciousness of its own. But in many other writings he claims, that organisms under the level 
of animals are too far from us in their bodily constitution, so we cannot constitute them as 
having a consciousness in the strict sense, (cf. Hua 9: 103f). If we follow a Husserlian approach, 
the jellyfish has the most primitive environment, with elementary signals and instinctual drives; 
which conscious life – on the other hand – is already astonishingly complex. 
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 II. Merleau-Ponty on the body—environment correlation 
Merleau-Ponty, in his interpretation concerning the origins and levels of consciousness, places 
the notion of behaviour and dynamism in the centre. He starts, from the very beginning, with 
the conception of embodied mind (which he – regarding the details of elaboration – inherits 
from Husserl), whose correlation is a dynamically constituted environment. In his analyses his 
point of departure is the realm of animals. As far as I can reconstruct, plants aren’t dynamic 
enough for him, to attribute them consciousness (as lived experiences) in a phenomenologically 
founded, legitimate way. The motile structures and responses of an animals, on the other hand, 
appear complex enough to conceive them as expressions of an internal, psychic reality; as a 
constitutive, experiencing openness to the environment.5  
A central motive of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of behaviour and psyche is his 
profound criticism of their mechanistic and reductionist account. According to him behaviour 
is nothing else than the dynamic relationship between lived body (as embodied mind, as 
incarnated subjectivity) and environment. Behaviour, in Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation, is 
essentially a normative activity: it is the fundamental mode in which the subject normalizes and 
optimizes his or her relationship to the environment. The essence of behaviour that it does not 
have an essence in the sense of traditional metaphysics: it is a choice from a variety of 
possibilities, from multiple options. It is never purely deterministic or mechanistic process; its 
dynamic character stems from the fact that it is always and essentially a matter of choice. 
Behaviour is never a mere reflex; it is adaptation to new situations, to new environment. It is 
about learning, remembering, expecting, making projections. Behaviour is principally 
temporal; just like subjectivity, whose external manifestation it is. 
The bodily organs are integrated into a complex system of behavioural relationship of the 
whole body and its environment. The more complex the bodily constitution is, the more 
complex is the behaviour and the environment which is constituted through this behaviour. The 
bodily organs – from a phenomenological point of view – have a constitutional meaning in 
regard of the body—behaviour—environment tripartite structure. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
only animals (and humans) have a behaviour in the strict sense of the word, (so: plants don’t). 
But in the case of animals, a more complex body involves the constitution of a more complex 
environment, through a more complex behavioural apparatus. Behaviour is manifested through 
sensorimotor structures and functions. Merleau-Ponty interprets external and internal, lived and 
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physical body, sensorial and motor structures as parts, as dependent moments of a greater 
whole, of the entire being-on-the-world (“être-au-monde”) of the living being. Consciousness, 
in Merleau-Ponty’s view, never can be other than conscious (and embodied) relationship to an 
environment. This relationship is fundamentally a normative one, as it implies that the living 
being seeks to find and grant the best conditions for his or her self-sustainment, satisfaction, 
life-activity, as possible.  
Though, in Merleau-Ponty’s opinion, animal is closed into his or her world, which is – in 
the strict sense of the word – rather should be called “environment”, and the world of human 
being – on the other hand – is essentially meaningful and open; and thus, there are fundamental 
differences between animal environment and human world, in his interpretation even with its 
so-to-say “enclosed” character, animal behaviour is essentially dynamic, and never something 
mechanical. Every single segment and moment of it – as part of a synthetic totality – is dynamic, 
such as life itself in general. 
